[This is a Guest Diary by Duncan Woosley, an ISC intern as part of the SANS.edu BACS program]
[This is a Guest Diary by Duncan Woosley, an ISC intern as part of the SANS.edu BACS program]
During the last three months I’ve had a DShield sensor online and collecting data from a deployment in AWS. This week I did some statistical analysis of the last three months of data and found surprising result. Of all the locations that scanned and attacked the DShield sensor, one location was a clear winner in terms of volume of traffic, accounting for over 65% of the total traffic sent to the sensor. To my surprise, that location was Panama!
Total DShield Sensor Traffic per Location
The top 10 locations were close to inline with common expectations, however, the traffic from Panama was greater than the total traffic from all the remaining locations combined!
Digging into the source of this anomaly, I filtered for traffic by day and found that there were massive spikes on just a few days in the last three months that accounted for most of the DShield sensor’s captured volume.
Largest Single Days by volume from April 7th to July 7th
Each spike was found to be caused by traffic from a single IP each day, but the IP responsible for each spike was different. However, six of the top ten most active IPs were all from a single /24 subnet! The subnet 141.98.80.0/24 was the cause of 59.4% of total logs collected by the sensor. Moreover, nine of the top 10 IPs were from the same internet service provider (ISP) named “NForce Entertainment B.V.”
Autonomous System Numbers (ASN) 43350 accounted for 71.6% of the total sensor logs! This ASN belonging to NForce Entertainment but NForce Entertainment appears to often lease out its IP space to other VPN and proxy providers like the Panama based Flyservers S.A. Flyservers is categorized as a “potentially very high fraud risk ISP” by Scamalytics and is likely the source of this activity.
Top ASNs by Total Traffic
Further research into this ISP found that the NForce Entertainment IP activity was often associated with phishing, malware, and scanning. As a Dutch ISP, they operate without strict regulatory oversight or pressure from their host nation to revoke threat actors’ use of their services.
Recommendations
Unfortunately, the solution for network defenders isn’t as simple as blocking all traffic from NForce Entertainment. If your organization is in a position where no NForce Entertainment traffic is required for business, this may be an option, but the majority of organizations don’t allow sweeping IP blocking. Instead, I would recommend blocking only sensitive services and HTTP(S) endpoints that allow for logins. The following actions are recommended.
• Flagging traffic from NForce Entertainment and particularly from ASN 43350.
• Block access to Remote Desktop Protocol from the internet.
• Monitor for SSH activity from ASN 43350 and configured SSH to use key based authentication.
• Implement a Web Application Firewall (WAF) for all web applications and monitor activity originating from any sources for suspicious queries.
• Create a WAF alert threshold for high traffic originating from a single source.
[1] https://www.arin.net/resources/guide/asn/
[2] https://scamalytics.com
[3] https://owasp.org/www-community/Web_Application_Firewall
[4] https://www.sans.edu/cyber-security-programs/bachelors-degree/
NOTE: ChatGTP was used for Spelling and grammar checks only
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Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc.
My GitHub Page
Twitter: GuyBruneau
gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
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